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The development of the ﬁfth edition of the American
Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders—the DSM-5—has
reenergised and driven further forward critical discourse
about the place and role of diagnosis in mental health.
The DSM-5 has attracted considerable criticism, not least
about its role in processes of medicalisation. This paper
suggests the need for a sociology of psychiatric critique.
Sociological analysis can help map ﬁelds of contention,
and cast fresh light on the assumptions and nuances of
debate around the DSM-5; it underscores the importance
of diagnosis to the governance of social and clinical life,
as well as the wider discourses critical commentaries
connect with and are activated by. More normatively, a
sociology of critique can indicate which interests and
values are structuring the dialogues being articulated,
and just how diverse clinical opinion regarding the DSM
can actually be. This has implications for the
considerations of health services and policy
decision-makers who might look to such debates for
guidance.
INTRODUCTION
The ﬁfth edition of the American Psychiatric
Association (APA) handbook of diagnosis, the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM-5), was published in spring 2013.
Readers will not, however, be encountering much
of its content for the ﬁrst time. For several years
now, the substance of the DSM-5 has been poured
over and debated, released online for scrutiny and
comment, and in the process subjected to wide-
ranging contestation and critique. Here, I consider
some of these critical comments. My intention is
not to wade into and further populate an already
crowded ﬁeld of debate. Rather, I aim to under-
score the import of a ‘sociology of critique’; that is,
an exploration and analysis of the kinds of critical
engagements evident within discourse associated
with a particular ﬁeld, and an attention to who is
making these, how, why and with what effects.
This includes unearthing some of the assumptions
and wider debates associated with the various criti-
cisms of DSM-5. Focusing on critique implicitly
reiterates a useful sociological point: there is not ‘a’
viewpoint within the mental health professions
regarding the DSM that all clinicians necessarily
and unproblematically align themselves with.
This essay draws on materials collected as part of
broader sensitising and contextualising work being
carried out as part of a Wellcome Trust-funded
Fellowship around the social ethical dimensions of
mental health (and hence does not present empir-
ical ﬁndings from a speciﬁc and deﬁned research
work-package per se). To this end, I begin by
noting some of the key concerns felt by many (and
advanced in biomedical literature and popular
media) with regard to the new diagnostic manual.
The article then moves to unpick the speciﬁc criti-
cisms made by Thomas Insel, Director of the US
National Institutes of Mental Health (NIMH)—a
powerful public sponsor of mental health research.
These have attracted considerable attention. In
order to underscore how critical mental health pro-
fessionals themselves can be of the infrastructure
governing their work, I have drawn especially on
the critique emanating from psychiatric and psy-
chological practitioners. I have selected these com-
ments on the basis of how regularly I encounter
them in my discussions about mental health with
professionals, patients and wider public.
The depth of feeling inherent to some of the
appraisals to be explored more fully below should
not, perhaps, surprise us. As Annemarie Jutel
rightly states in her sociological treatise on diagnosis:
‘The power of diagnosis is remarkable’.1 Diagnosis
is a means of focusing clinical attention, indicating
treatment, suggesting prognosis, and sometimes
conferring social and economic beneﬁts. My own
attention to diagnosis is shaped by a broadly social
constructionist engagement with mental health and
illness in that I view diagnostic categories as being
constituted, in part, through professional, patient
and political claims-making and debate.2 In the
idiom of philosopher Ian Hacking, I take diagnosis
to be an apparatus through which individuals
‘make up’ themselves and one another.3 Through
this, individuals and societies learn how to recog-
nise ‘normal’ and ‘pathological’ experiences, relate
to substances and practices (such as pharmaceuticals
and psychological therapies), and negotiate situa-
tions saturated with moral feeling and implications
(restraint, discharge and access to services being just
a few examples).4–9 In this sense, diagnostic texts
like the DSM come to shape, and be shaped by, a
wide range of social actors and institutions, and
hence have salience for these—perhaps especially
in the case of more contested categories.10 11
THE CONTROVERSY OVER DSM-5
In September 1999, the APA held its ﬁrst confer-
ence—jointly sponsored by the NIMH—on the
‘DSM-V’ (at this point, Roman numerals were
being used in the acronym for the proposed new
edition of the manual). This event sought to set
research priorities relevant for future classiﬁcations,
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rather than explore the necessary steps for making a new
manual.12 Since then, the APA has been a hive of activity with
regard to the development of its new nosology. The DSM Task
Force has generated considerable, and sometimes acrimonious,
debate. Criticism has come from a range of quarters within the
USA and UK, perhaps most prominently from many leading
members of the biomedical community itself.
In February 2010—4 years after the APA appointed David
Kupfer (University of Pittsburgh) to Chair the DSM-5 Task Force
—the website http://www.dsm5.org presented draft criteria for
the new manual. This has subsequently been framed by the APA
as an attempt to democratise processes of diagnostic innovation.
However, this only occurred after broad and serious concerns
were advanced by a number of psychiatrists that key decisions
were being made ‘behind closed doors’.13 14 Following the publi-
cation of the draft, various articles and commentaries were pro-
duced—many focusing on the main alterations that Kupfer’s
committee was endeavouring to make to the DSM. These
included a number of major diagnostic changes (although subse-
quently some of these decisions were overturned).15 Thereafter, a
wave of criticism washed over the Task Force.
At the most general level, this was directed at the so-called
medicalisation of normality that the DSM-5 was deemed to be
driving. This refers to the mechanisms by which bodily and psy-
chological experiences come to be situated within and under-
stood through a medical framework.16 As sociologist Nikolas
Rose points out, ascribing a process as one of medicalisation
immediately casts it as ‘suspect’.17 In a much discussed editorial,
Til Wykes and Felicity Callard noted that a range of new cat-
egories were proposed for introduction in the new manual and
hence the doubts about its validity multiplied.18 Allen Frances,
Chair of the DSM-IV Task Force, came to be a remarkably pro-
liﬁc and vocal critic of the proposed changes. In a BMJ editorial,
he described the ‘grave’ consequences of ‘false positive epi-
demics’ of disorders that would be constituted through inappro-
priate usage of new diagnostic entities; in so doing, DSM-5
would ‘expand the territory of mental disorder and thin the
ranks of the normal’.19 In other words, it would help to further
‘medicalise’ society.
Such points were reiterated by Frances across a number of
platforms, including interviews with the media, a blog for the
US magazine Psychology Today, academic articles and two
books.20 21 That they found a home in general readership
forums like Psychology Today could, perhaps, suggest a degree
of resonance between Frances’ position and wider public feeling
regarding the medicalisation of different kinds of experiences
recognised by many as ‘normal’. However, social scientists Allan
V Horwitz and Jerome C Wakeﬁeld nevertheless argue persua-
sively that US citizens have come to be increasingly accepting of
medication for DSM disorders (which we might infer as indicat-
ing at least some public acceptance of their legitimacy).22 This
speaks to the complex relationships that a variety of actors have
with the DSM, and underlines diversity of positions that can be
maintained regarding the DSM in professional and public
debate.
Alongside and related to concerns around medicalisation per
se were speciﬁc criticisms centring on particular categories. The
incorporation of Asperger’s Syndrome within Autism Spectrum
Disorder is one example; concerns here included the implica-
tions for longitudinal research following diagnostic shift, and
the effects of change on lobbying, support and services by and
for individuals previously labelled with Asperger’s Syndrome.23
The role of grief within Major Depressive Disorder formed
another locus of debate (and has been written about extensively
by Frances). This is of particular interest here as a consequence
of its relationship with wider arguments about the DSM and the
extent to which it was incorporating ever more aspects of, for
some, everyday experience within a psychiatric rubric.
To brieﬂy summarise, the DSM-IV included a ‘bereavement
exclusion’ aimed at parsing out depression following grief that
could be regarded as normal from that which might indicate
mental illness. Speciﬁcally, it was advised that major depression
not be diagnosed in individuals within 2 months of the death of
a loved-one. However, the DSM-5 Task Force removed this
from the new manual, justiﬁed in terms of bereavement not
necessarily being an excluding factor for clinically-salient
depression, and indeed potentially a precipitating factor to it.
This elicited a hostile response from clinicians, patients and acti-
vists, and other publics.24 Such concerns were highlighted in
various news media (especially in the USA and the UK), includ-
ing the Hufﬁngton Post, the Jerusalem Post, the Sydney Morning
Herald, USA Today and Wired. This wider discussion, developed
from a speciﬁc professional debate, highlights the great degree
to which a range of actors in Anglophonic countries where the
DSM has traction ﬁnd (or, at least, are assumed by journalists to
ﬁnd) the idea that grief could potentially be classed as a mental
disorder highly unpalatable. Consequently, this case also indi-
cates the ‘lines in the sand’ that can, sometimes, be deemed pos-
sible to draw around the jurisdiction of medical authority.
In some senses, there is nothing especially novel about the
debates noted above: critics have long attacked the validity and
reliability of the DSM, and indeed the wider kinds of medical-
isation it is often deemed to promote.25 Relating to this are cri-
ticisms of the role of drugs for mental health conditions. The
pharmaceutical industry can be regarded as what Jutel calls an
‘engine of diagnosis’, which helps to power changes to the APA
nosology and then becomes further embroiled in the processes
of medicalisation that help to support ‘pharmaceuticalisation’.26
This is the tendency to reframe (and perhaps ‘create’) patholo-
gies as amenable to pharmaceutical intervention, which some
ﬁnd disquieting.27 Accordingly, we can see how criticisms of the
DSM-5 can be better understood when viewed as part of a
wider tradition of psychiatric critique, as well as more recent
forms of contestation around biomedicine. This history of cri-
tique provides a seed bed for contemporary concerns to grow
and ﬂower, as well as a structural logic for their articulation (ie,
a sense of how, in what format and where they should be
advanced in order to be heard). At the same time, the debate
the DSM-5 propels helps to bring these longstanding issues
more sharply into focus.
THE APA AND THE NIMH
A major point of departure in the wider debate around DSM-5,
(re)contouring the topology of critique, was the apparent distan-
cing of the US NIMH from this text. On 29 April 2013, NIMH
Director Thomas R Insel published, as part of his regular
‘Director’s Blog’ series, a riposte to the APA manual.28 Starting
by acknowledging some of the contention associated with
DSM-5, and the kinds of changes that might be made, Insel
went on to say:
The strength of each of the editions of DSM has been “reliabil-
ity” […]. The weakness is its lack of validity. Unlike our deﬁni-
tions of ischemic heart disease, lymphoma, or AIDS, the DSM
diagnoses are based on a consensus about clusters of clinical
symptoms, not any objective laboratory measure. In the rest of
medicine, this would be equivalent to creating diagnostic systems
based on the nature of chest pain or the quality of fever.28
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More boldly still, Insel noted that this ‘is why NIMH will be
re-orientating its research away from DSM categories’.28
Insel’s piece attracted considerable attention, with key US
(and other international) news media picking it up (eg, the
Globe and Mail, the Guardian, the Hufﬁngton Post, Time and
the New York Times). That such an august research institution as
the NIMH seemed to be attacking—or, at the very least, ques-
tioning—the DSM appeared to legitimate wider and ongoing
debate about the place, role and impact of diagnosis. As a soci-
ologist of mental health, over summer 2013 it was common for
people (eg, patients, professionals, other interested publics) to
ask me whether the NIMH was moving away from the DSM,
and the implications of this for the validity of the text and the
diagnostic categories it contained.
It is not clear, however, that Insel had any intention of attack-
ing a wider project of diagnosis for mental ill-health. In particu-
lar, his blog highlighted the ‘Research Domain Criteria’ (RDoC)
initiative. This aims to deﬁne ‘basic dimensions of functioning’
which could ‘be studied across multiple units of analysis, from
genes to neural circuits to behaviors, cutting across disorders as
traditionally deﬁned’, with the intent of increasing innovation
for the treatment of mental disorders.29 The RDoC can be seen
as part of a broader ‘technosomatic emphasis’ long evident
within US psychiatry and the NIMH (ie, a concentration on
bodily correlates of mental ill-health, and the use of technolo-
gies to render them more visible to scientists and clinicians).11
The RDoC initiative also articulates with wider investigative
efforts around the location of ‘biomarkers’ for health and
illness.30 In so doing, it represents a form of ‘biomedicalisation’;
that is, a form of medicalisation that is intrinsically linked with
specialised biological science focusing on bodily processes and
signs of pathology that operate at a level often too microscopic
for inspection within standard clinical settings.31 Insel’s blog
makes plain these links to developments around biomarkers in
other areas of medicine:
Some will see RDoC as an academic exercise divorced from clin-
ical practice. But patients and families should welcome this
change as a ﬁrst step towards “precision medicine,” the move-
ment that has transformed cancer diagnosis and treatment.
RDoC is nothing less than a plan to transform clinical practice by
bringing a new generation of research to inform how we diag-
nose and treat mental disorders.28
While Insel is clearly critical of DSM-5, his main purpose in
contributing to claims-making about this manual is to use his
critique as a vehicle for advancing a speciﬁcally NIMH research
agenda, taking advantage of the enlargement of the discursive
sphere around mental health that the advent of the DSM
enjoined in order to do this. This same strategy had been
employed previously, in 2010, when the journal Science pub-
lished a news piece on the development of the RDoC and its
relationship to the APA manual a month after the DSM-5 draft
criteria had been published online.32 In light of the attention
Insel commanded, it is thus notable that the RDoC project was
not unveiled in tandem with the DSM-5 but rather had been
progressing for several years. Indeed, the emphasis of RDoC on
the biology of psychopathology will no doubt be troubling to
many who construe Insel’s blog as being a larger attack than I
suggest it should be interpreted as being.
This reading makes more sense when we examine the subse-
quent press release produced by the NIMH on the 13 May
2013, and jointly authored by Insel and Columbia University’s
Jeffrey A Lieberman, President-elect on the APA. In it, we can
read that contrary to any notion that Insel was espousing
anything like ‘antipsychiatric’ ideas, the NIMH and APA have
(as the title of the press release puts it) ‘shared interests’:
Today, the […] [DSM] along with the International Classiﬁcation of
Diseases (ICD) represents the best information currently available
for clinical diagnosis of mental disorders. Patients, families, and
insurers can be conﬁdent that effective treatments are available and
that the DSM is the key resource for delivering the best available
care. The […] [NIMH] has not changed its position on DSM-5.33
The press release concludes by noting that ‘By continuing to
work together, our two organizations are committed to improv-
ing outcomes for people with some of the most disabling disor-
ders in all of medicine’.33
Insel’s comments, the media interest surrounding them and
the swift attempt to dispel this are revealing of the multiple
subject positions, hopes, expectations and concerns that circu-
late around the projects of diagnosis in mental health. To begin
with, Insel’s blog post illuminates the ambivalence the DSM
often elicits. For instance, it is not uncommon for health profes-
sionals to use this manual while simultaneously feeling uneasy
about its contents.34 Insel did not say anything particularly new;
the signiﬁcance of his comments rather lies in the extent that
they were brought into public discourse. While Insel’s reﬂec-
tions were rendered newsworthy as a consequence of his ofﬁce
and the attention the DSM was receiving at the time, it is
unclear whether wider debates were reshaped in the process.
In particular, the focusing of some wider discussion about
Insel’s blog on his perceived rejection of the DSM, as opposed to
his espousing of an NIMH alternative, served to problematise
one particular diagnostic enterprise within psychiatry, rather than
encouraging debate about diagnosis per se. Moreover, it also
elided the clinical and ethical implications of Insel’s own biomed-
ical focus and the ever-more somatic approach the RDoC
appears to seek to propel (which resonates with the biological
emphasis evident in US psychiatry and the APA). The discursive
ﬁeld within which criticisms of the DSM were voiced was thus
expanded by Insel, but its nature did not appear to be remade.
Nevertheless, the rapidity with which the NIMH and APA
sought to close down the public debate via the release of a joint
press release casts a bright light on two key issues. First, the
potential reputational capital lost for the APA, its need to regain
this and its power in being able to make this public reclamation.
Second, the profound importance of diagnosis in general and
the DSM-5 per se in the administration of pathology, in terms
of treatment, insurance, research and the management of daily
life for very many people. Accordingly, public doubts about
DSM-5 were, it seems, held to be deeply troubling by both the
NIMH and APA, and a clear statement about its current utility
necessarily advanced in order to uphold trust and conﬁdence in
both diagnostic categories and (US) psychiatry more broadly.
The engines of diagnosis, then, continue to turn.
DISCUSSION
The DSM-5 has attracted broad criticism. This critique has a
‘social life’, and sociological engagement with that reveals both
the underlying assumptions critical commentary rests upon as
well as which forms produce most traction. Appraisals of the
DSM-5 which take as their focus the capacity of this handbook
to become embroiled in processes of medicalisation are espe-
cially prevalent, and have been made by many mental health
professionals themselves (as well as by activists and other ‘stake-
holders’, evidenced through interviews in and responses to
some of the news media noted above). Such a critique does
not represent a radical departure from established critical
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commentary on psychiatry and psychology.25 Rather, we might
see the anticipatory discourse stimulated by the advent of
DSM-5 as reenergising longstanding debates around the utility
and validity of the APA nosology.
News media and other kinds of online commentaries have cir-
culated around already active groups and actors with a history
of providing robust commentary on the DSM (in particular, see
the many posts on and linking from/to journalist Robert
Whittaker’s website—http://www.madinamerica.com—which is
one important umbrella site for critical engagements with psych-
iatry). However, within media items themselves, the critique
foregrounded has commonly come from already prominent clin-
icians and scientists, as well as third-sector organisations with a
considerable public presence (eg, the mental health charity,
Mind). Contributions from smaller support groups, and individ-
ual activists and patients, are less visible. This should not neces-
sarily surprise us—and, moreover, there are instances of media
coverage situating debates about the DSM in a wider clinical
and social context (take, for instance, the wide-ranging coverage
of the DSM to be found in the web pages of the Guardian
newspaper). Yet, we might query whether the inclusion of non-
clinical voices and perspectives would have occurred at all if it
was not for key psychiatrists such as Allen Frances questioning
the tools of their own profession.
Furthermore, focusing primarily on the kinds of criticisms
made by Frances—that is, regarding whether particular diagnos-
tic categories are valid or reliable—also risks distracting us from
other kinds of critical engagement. Speciﬁcally, we might usefully
consider whether scholars and other commentators on the DSM
could broaden out their arguments over whether diagnostic
entities contained within the DSM are ‘right’ or ‘wrong’—or
even ‘good’ or ‘bad’—and reﬂect more fully on the kinds of
rights and responsibilities that different diagnoses and diagnostic
tools enable and constrain.5 35 36 By this I mean, for instance,
where and how diagnoses are used both to facilitate and exclude
individuals from accessing particular services and beneﬁts, and
indeed how they are employed in the actual design of services.
This perspective recognises just how constitutive practices of
diagnosis are to psychiatry, psychology and nursing, while also
recalling that mental health professionals can view these antago-
nistically, or as a kind of ‘convenient ﬁction’ to enable communi-
cation, collaboration and care.34 A renewed focus on the uses to
which diagnostic categories are put—and an expansion of the
sphere of public discourse around this to include voices which
are less seldom heard—might provide a more practice-orientated
and potentially patient-centred basis for normative assertions
about the design and delivery of mental health systems.
To be clear: I am not claiming that arguments over the cap-
acity of diagnoses to, for instance, form the basis for the med-
icalisation of ‘normal’ behaviour are redundant. Critical work
which carefully and clearly interrogates the making and
meaning of diagnostic categories remains vital, and contributes
to wider social and clinical debates that remake the realities they
emerge from. Nor, indeed, do I wish to suggest that that much
important work on the use of diagnosis has not already been
carried out (and perhaps especially by service user organisations
in the form of evaluation, research and resources). Diagnostic
entities are powerful things, shaping society and individual sub-
jectivities; it is, then, precisely for this reason that we should
concern ourselves with what they are and with what they do.
CONCLUSIONS
The development of DSM-5 has resulted in wide-ranging critical
commentary, underscoring the importance of diagnosis to the
governance of social life. A sociological analysis of critique can
help map out its multiple dimensions, as well enable us to
understand and interrogate the assumptions it is built around
and the uses to which it is put.37 In so doing, an analysis of a
critique of one speciﬁc case—that is, the DSM—can reveal how
debate is contoured by a broader ‘ecology’ of criticism asso-
ciated with the ﬁeld (ie, mental health) more generally (eg, con-
cerns around pharmaceuticalisation and medicalisation). This in
itself has normative implications since it directs attention to con-
cerns and issues that are not being so loudly voiced, and voices
which are not allowed to be heard. For biomedical ethics, it also
enjoins a sensitivity to nuance and the contexts within which
knowledge claims are advanced, especially when these are
heavily inﬂected with moral discourse (eg, regarding the validity
of changes to the category of depression). Attending to the plur-
ality of perspectives different actors and institutions express in
relation to diagnostic entities, tools and practices reminds us
that uniformity of opinion within professional (but also patient
and other) communities cannot be taken for granted. This must
necessarily be kept in mind when formulating ethical questions
and directives that involve diagnosis and DSM-5.
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